Abstract-This paper proposes an approach for testing of safety critical systems. It is based on a behavioral and a fault model. The two models are analyzed for compatibility and necessary changes are identified to make them compatible. Then transformation rules are used to transform the fault model into the same model type as the behavioral model. Integration rules define how to combine them. This approach results in an integrated model which then can be used to generate tests using a variety of testing criteria. The paper illustrates this general framework using a CEFSM for the behavioral model and a Fault Tree for the fault model. A case study from the literature illustrates how to apply the approach.
I. INTRODUCTION
Safety-critical systems have become an essential part of our world. For example, automobiles, medical devices, and aircraft systems rely heavily on software. With such systems also comes the exposure to risks because some of these systems may fail or may not work properly resulting in damage, injury, or death. Potential system failure that results in damage, injury, or death is referred to as a mishap risk. For example, there is a danger that an air traffic control system will fail, resulting in the mishap of two planes colliding with each other.
Testing is an important part of ensuring safe, dependable systems. Model-based testing (MBT) [9] is common for functional testing. Models provide a functional view of the system that can be used to produce test cases without using the actual system implementation details because it is very difficult to cover all code structures especially for complex dependable systems [26] . MBT focuses on testing the system behavior (also known as desired behavior). However, when testing safety in safety-critical software (also known as undesired behavior), these models may not be sufficient and more information about safety related aspects of the system is needed to perform such activities. It is obvious that we can not use a model to test a behavior that it does not describe. Thus, using behavioral models alone to test the undesired behavior of a system will not be adequate.
While MBT techniques exist for a variety of behavioral models such as Unified Modeling Language (UML), Finite State Machines (FSMs), Extended Finite State Machines (EFSMs), and Communicating Extended Finite State Machines (CEFSMs), they do not systematically model fault behavior. On the other hand, techniques to model failure behavior [12] and failure mitigation [2, 19] do not address testing.
Very few papers integrate both and are used for safety analysis only [11, 16, 17, 24] . Fewer still address testing with an integrated model [23, 25] . Unfortunately, they have only been applied to relatively small examples, so their scalability is uncertain. Compatibility between Fault models and behavioral models is also an issue.
This paper proposes a technique to integrate failure and behavioral models for the purpose of testing both functional and fail-safe behavior that allows for a variety of testing criteria is, scalable, and includes a step that formalizes compatibility between behavioral and failure model. The integrated models can be thought of as communicating processes.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II contains a brief background related to behavioral and fault models and reviews the existing work. Section III describes the overall approach, defines CEFSM and Fault Tree (FT), describes the transformation rules, the transformation procedure of FT into CEFSM, and test case generation from CEFSMs. Section IV illustrates an example using a gas burner system. Finally, we conclude in section V.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK

A. Communicating Extended Finite State Machines (CEFSMs)
CEFSMs [7] are an extended type of the traditional FSMs that provides data flow modeling and communications mechanisms. CEFSMs are capable of modeling and testing communicating systems as their specification includes variables, operations based on variables, and interactions between them that FSMs cannot model in a concise way [20] . They are the bases for many design languages such as Petri nets, Message Sequence Chart (MSC), and Specification and Description Language (SDL) [22] . Communicating processes can often be modeled and tested as a collection of CEFSMs [7] . A variety of automated tools exist used for testing CEFSM such as SDT/ITEX [10] , EFTG [6] , and Construction and Analysis of Distributed Processes (CADP) [1] , known as CAESAR/ALDEBARAN.
Some of the work in testing concurrent systems deals only with communicating finite state machines (CFSMs) where the data part of the protocol is not considered [5] , while others consider data and control. Henniger et al. [13] present an algorithm to generate a test purpose description of the behavior of a system of asynchronous CEFSMs. A test purpose can be expressed by a Message Sequence Chart (MSC) that describes the behavior to be checked. Bourhfir et al. [4, 5] generate test cases for systems modeled by CEFSM. The test cases are generated for the global system by performing a complete reachability analysis, and generating test cases.
Hesse et al. [14] present an algorithm for generating test suites by reachability analysis. The algorithm uses, in each step, global information about the state space to guide the analysis and to speed up termination. Kovács et al. in [18] designed methods and mutation operators to enable the automation of test selection in a CEFSM. The mutation operators create erroneous specifications that provide the basis for test case selection.
Boroday et al. [3] use a CEFSM to generate test cases by combining the specification and fault coverage. They compute a test suite that offers specification coverage. They derive a confirming sequence from the Fault model to check both states and data of each test with respect to the fault model.Li et al. [22] use FSMs to model behavior and events. The extension of events with variables is used to model data while the events' interaction channels are used to model communication.
The tests are generated based on a combination of behavior, data, and communication specifications. The method addresses branching coverage for data-related decision coverage and behavioral transition coverage.
B. Fault Modeling and Analysis
In safety-critical systems, it is essential to prevent failures so that the system can be considered safe. In order to do that, some classical techniques, such as FTA, Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), and Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOPS), have been used. The area of fault-based testing focuses mainly on faults in software [25] . Hazard analysis techniques such as FTA, have been used in safety-critical software. FTA was borrowed from other scientific paradigms and applied for the first time in software safety analysis in [21] .
C. Integration of Safety Analysis and Behavioral Models a) Safety analysis:
Safety analysis improves the probability of uncovering possible faults in safety-critical software. El Ariss et al. [11] present an approach for integrating fault-tree-based safety analysis into a functional model. They transform a FT to a statechart preserving the semantics of the fault tree and the statechart. The model shows how the system behaves when a failure condition occurs. The integrated model's purpose is for validation of safety requirements rather than testing.
Kim et al. [17] develop an algorithm to transform hazards of an FT into a UML statechart diagram in order to perform safety analysis. The primary events and gates of a FT are represented in a UML statechart notation. Transformation rules create a statechart diagram that can be used for safety analysis. The transformed fault tree falls into the lowest level of the composed state machine making it difficult to analyze the diagram for safety due to the indirect paths to causes of hazards.
Kaiser et al. in [15] proposed a combination of fault trees with an explicit State/Event semantics, State/Event Fault Trees (SEFTs). This model uses the fault tree to represent faults which are connected to the state or event in the state/event model that describes the system behavior. This model is used for safety analysis only. Ortmeier et al. [24] present an approach to formally model failure modes. The functional model and the failure modes are represented as a statechart and integrated as orthogonal regions of a statechart. The integrated model is used for safety analysis only.
b) Safety testing: Testing safety-critical software differs from testing non-safety-critical software in many ways. Before testing safety-critical software systems, we need to conduct a safety analysis for the system to find possible safety breaches and what may cause them. We need to test desired behavior in the presence of failures. Sánchez et al. [25] proposed a fault-based approach for generating test cases to overcome the limitations of specification-based approaches that derive from the incompleteness of the specification of undesirable behavior, and from the tendency of specifications to focus on the desired behavior, rather than potential faults. Minimum cut sets of the FT are used to determine how undesirable states can occur in a system. These sets are transformed to equivalent statechart components. These components are integrated into the behavioral model of the system and transformed to EFSMs to flatten the hierarchical and concurrent structure of states and to eliminate broadcast communication. The problem is that flattening a statechart into an EFSM model makes it grow exponentially causing scalability problems.
Similarly, Nazier et al. [23] transform fault tree events into elements of a statechart behavior model. They verify system correctness and criticality using a model checker.
III. APPROACH
In this approach, we propose an integration of the behavioral model with a fault model to take advantage of the two for testing. We need to generate behavioral tests to test the system behavior, generate failures at appropriate points e.g. by injecting events into the test model [28] , and test proper mitigation. We also need to define coverage criteria for all three.
A. Test Generation Process
The test generation process shown in Fig. 1 
B. Behavioral Model: Communicating EFSM (CEFSM)
CEFSM has been used in modeling and testing distributed systems and network protocols. The strength of CEFSM is that it can model orthogonal states of a system in a flat manner and does not need to compose the whole system in one state as in statecharts which would make it more complicated and harder to analyze and/or test.
CEFSMs can be defined as a finite set of consistent and completely specified EFSMs [8] that are composed via communications channels that carry input and output messages [20] : CEFSM = (S, s 0 , E, P, T, A, M, V, C), such that: S is a finite set of states, s 0 is the initial state, E is a set of events, P is a set of boolean predicates, T is a set of transition functions such that T: S×P ×E→S×A×M , A is a set of actions, M is a set of communicating messages, V is a set of variables, and C is the set of input/output communication channel used in this CEFSM.
State changes (action language): The function T returns a next state, a set of output signals, and action list for each combination of a current state, an input signal, and a predicate. It is defined as:
where, s i is the current state, s j is the next state, p i is the predicate that must be true in order to execute the transition, e i is the event that when combined with a predicate trigger the transition function, m i1 ,..., m i k are the messages.
The communicating message m i is defined as: (mId, e j , mDestination) where, mId is the message identifier, and mDestination is the CEFSM the message is sent to. An event e i is defined as: (eId, eOccurrence, eStatus) where, eId is the event type identifier that uniquely identifies it, and eOccurrence is set to false as long as the event has not occurred for the first time and to true otherwise, and eStatus is set to true each time the event occurs and to false when it no longer applies. Note that eStatus allows reoccurring events to happen multiple times (loops in the model).
CEFSMs communicate by exchanging messages through communication channels C that connect the outputs of one CEFSM to the input other CEFSMs. Let C denote the set {⟨name, SYNC|ASYNC⟩| for all the channels in the system} where name is the name of the communication channel and SYNC and ASYNC indicate that the channel is synchronous or asynchronous. A same communication channel can be used differently according to different transitions. A channel c ∈ C can be represented as ⟨name, t, get()/send()⟩ where, name is the name of the channel, t ∈ T refers to the transition linked to this use of the channel, and get()/send() indicates whether this channel is an input or an output channel.
The action a i may include an assignment and mathematical operation on the variables. The predicate is a condition that must be met prior to the execution of the function. For example, T(S 0 , e 0 , total = 4)/(S 1 , {m 0 , m 1 }, (total = 0; increment(i))) describes that if a CEFSM is in a state S 0 receives an event e 0 and the value of variable total is four at that time, it will move to the next state S 1 and output m 0 and m 1 after setting the total to zero and performing increment(i). For full formal semantics see [7] .
C. Fault Tree (FT)
A FT is composed of nodes, edges, and gates. Gates are logical connectors of events, while nodes represent events, and edges connect nodes to gates. When FT is used to model faults, every major failure is represented by a separate fault tree. Table I lists the gate types we consider here.Qualitative analysis shows the set of events that, when they happen together, contribute to cause the hazard. Qualitative analysis is applicable when integrating faults into the system model because the analysis is performed on the actual occurrence of the set of possible faults rather than on their probabilities of occurrence.
D. Compatibility Transformation
The basic events in fault trees (leaf nodes) depend on the scope, resolution and the ground rules [27] . The scope of the FT indicates which failure will be included and which will not, the resolution is the level of detail at which these basic events will be developed, and the ground rules include the procedure and terminology used to name these events. Often, the basic events in fault trees are informally described, i.e. in a natural language. If the resolution or the event naming does not match that of the behavioral model, which is often the case, we say these models are not compatible. Therefore, we need to make these models compatible in order to be able to integrate them. Behavioral and Fault models are said to be compatible if they describe the same level of abstraction and the same events in both models have the same meaning. 
E. FT´model Transformation
Events can be classified as either "transient" or "persistent" [24] . A transient event is an event that is reversible i.e. it can appear and disappear completely, while the persistent event once it occurs, stays. An ordinary fault tree, which statically describes hazard, does not consider this distinction between events because this distinction would not make a difference for a static model. However, it is essential to consider the event type attribute when making a fault tree dynamic. The event type determines if the status of the event can be "not-occurred" after it had already "occurred". The change of the event status makes the integrated fault tree react according to the status of the event in the behavioral model. Note that our transformation rules allow for modeling transient events unlike the classical fault trees where all the events are persistent. However, the FT´is a static model that describes the hazard as a specific combination of events. In order for the FT´to be integrated into a behavioral model it has to be dynamic and understands the behavioral model's events. To accomplish that, we have to transform the FT´to a CEFSM format. Every gate in the FT´is represented as a GCEFSM. The whole model forms a tree-like structure. The communication between the behavioral model and FT´model is achieved by sending and receiving messages between the models. The behavioral model sends messages to the Fault related GCEFSMs, but they do not send any message back to the behavioral model. Upon receiving those messages, the GCEFSMs at the lower level of the tree sends messages that carry "the event occurred" or "has not occurred" to the upper level GCEFSMs and so on. The output message from one GCEFSM is taken as a parameter to a generic event in the receiving GCEFSM, e.g. event(param) = get(m i ).
To make the FT´to GCEFSM transformation automatic, the representation of the FT events and gates in GCEFSM is standardized. Each gate must be given an identifier that uniquely identifies it. The output of the gate, which is an input to another gate, should carry the same identification number as the gate that outputs it. If the gate event has occurred, a message m i is sent to the receiving gate indicating that the event has occurred. The output of each gate is an input to another gate. The GCEFSM may be in one of three conditions; it has not received any input messages so far, it received a message that says the gate event has occurred, or received a message that says the gate event has not occurred.
1) Transformation Rules:
The transformation rules use the notation for e,m introduced for CEFSM in section III-B. Every gate in the FT´is converted to an equivalent representation in CEFSM i.e. Gate CEFSM (GCEFSM). Every GCEFSM is identified by a unique identifier G i that uniquely identifies the gate. The set of variables V are:
• TotalNoOfEvents is the total number of input events to the gate.
• NoOfOccurredEvents is the number of occurred events that the gate received so far.
• NoOfPositiveEvents is the number of occurred events whose eStatus is true.
Each GCEFSM consists of states and transitions that perform the same boolean function as the gates in an FT. The difference is that in the original FT, a gate produces a single output when all the input events satisfy the gate conditions. Otherwise, no output would be produced. However, in the transformed FT, a gate has two kinds of outputs. One output is defined as the "Gate occurred" and the other is defined as "Gate not occurred" such that:
..e k ) = true, Gate not Occurred if G i (e 1 , e 2 , ...e k ) = f alse and eOccurrence = true ∀e i , i = 1 to k For example, an AND gate = true if G AN D (e 1 ∩ e 2 ... ∩ e k ) = true. Each structure and behavior of each GCEFSM is predefined and for this matter we will present each gate as follows: Fig. 3 . AND gate representation in FT and GCEFSM a) AND Gate: When combining some events with an AND gate, the output occurs when all the events occur. Otherwise, no output would occur. An AND gate is represented as shown in Fig. 3 . It consists of two states and four transitions. State S 0 is the initial state and S 1 is the "gate occurred" state. The transition T 2 will never be taken unless its predicate NoOfOccurredEvents=TotalNoOfEvents & e i .eOccurrence =true & e i .eStatus = true is true which means all the inputs are received and their status is true. When T 2 is taken the message "gate occurred" is sent to a GCEFSM that is supposed to receive it. The transition T 0 is as follows:
1) The event get(m j ) gets input messages from the environment or from another CEFSM. m i contains an event that could be "gate occurred" or "gate not occurred". 2) update(events) is an action performed upon the executing of this transition. It updates the number of occurred events and their status based on the last input message received.
3) The predicate "[e j .eOccurrence = true & e j .eStatus = true & NoOfOccurredEvents < TotalNoOfEvents]" ensures that the event has occurred and the number of inputs received so far is less than the total number of inputs and the input status is true. Note that "gate not occurred" implies that eOccurrence=true&eStatus=false, while "gate occurred" implies that eOccurrence=true&eStatus=true.
If all the messages to this GCEFSM are received and all the events have occurred, then the transition T 2 will be taken. 
b) INHIBIT Gate:
INHIBIT is similar to the AND gate. They have the same states and transitions. The only difference is that the predicate for the transitions T 2 and T 3 should include the enabling condition. We do not need to have a separate gate representation for NOT gate since we can express it in any predicate. If we want to negate any event we can use the NOT logical operator inside the gate that the negated event is one of its inputs. c) XOR Gate: This gate is slightly different from the AND gate although it has the same structure and same number of transitions and states. At this gate, it is necessary to distinguish between the event that has not occurred in the first place and the one whose status is false. The representation of GCEFSM XOR gate is shown in Fig. 4 . T 0 to T 3 are the possible transitions that may be taken based on their predicates.
eOccurrence = true & xor(events)=false], get(m j ))/(S 0 ,update(events),-) T 2 :(S 0 ,[NoOfOccurredEvents=1&e j .eOccurrence=true&xor(e vents)=true],get(m j ))/(S 1 ,update(events),Send(gateOccurred)) T 3 :(S 1 ,[inputStatusChanged(e j )=true],get(m j ))/(S 0 ,update( events),Send(gate not occurred))
d) Priority AND Gate: As seen in Fig. 5 , the priority AND gate is very similar to the AND gate in the overall structure and transitions. It differs from the AND gate in that the events have to happen in predetermined order. This difference is taken care of by manipulating the predicate condition in such a way that it considers the order of occurrence of the events. For example, if the events are ordered E 0 then E 1 , they have to happen in this order so that the gate can occur. Otherwise the gate will not occur. T 0 to T 3 are the transitions that control the priority AND gate. Fig. 6 , consists of two states and four transitions. When in S 0 and the input message carries an event whose eOccurrence and eStatus are true (i.e. the event has occurred), T 0 is taken and the OR gate occurs. In state S 1 and if the events in the input messages have not occurred (i.e. their eStatus is false) and there was only one input so far, which means this input has changed its status, then a "Gate not occurred" message is sent. Otherwise, no message is sent out of this gate and only update(events) actions take place. A timed simple event is the simple event that should occur for a specific period of time to contribute to a hazard. However, FT has no timing gates. Therefore, we need to have a representation that can handle the timing issue (either a minimum or maximum timing). Thus, we introduce this gate that can time an event and the gate in the subsection III-E1g that deals with the timing intervals. This gate works as follows. Upon receiving a message that indicates the occurrence of the event, the transition T 0 takes place which starts the timer. When the time expires and no further "gate not occurred" message was received that indicates that the event is no longer happening, the transition T 2 is taken and sends a "gate occurred" message. Otherwise the gate does not occur. T 2 is taken when the event status e i .eStatus changes to false. For example, we may need to observe an occurrence of an event every consecutive 5 sec as long as the system is operational. Fig. 8 shows that as long as the transition 
T 0 is fired and T 2 was not, the event will be timed for fixed consecutive amounts of time and it keeps timing until the status of the event e i .eStatus changes to false. Upon receiving this event change, the transition T 3 to the state S 1 is fired sending out a "gate not occurred" message. 2) Transformation procedure: As mentioned above, the transformed GCEFSMs form a tree-like structure and each GCEFSM gate is denoted by a unique identifier G i that uniquely identifies the gate. The transformation procedure shown in Fig. 9 takes an FT as an input and produces GCEFSMs according to a postorder tree traversal. Event-gate table is used for the integration of GCEFSMs model with the behavioral model. It contains the entries for all leaf nodes of the FT and is defined as shown in Table II. This table is constructed during the transformation of FT to GCEFSM. The leaf node event name and identifier are inserted into the table entry along with the identifier of the gate that receives this event.
F. Model Integration
Before integrating the models, all the messages from the behavioral model to the fault model have the form of equation (1). At that time the event id contains the events name and attribute and the receiving gate id of that event is not known yet. During the integration of both models, the event name in each message in the behavioral model is looked up in the event-gate table. If the event name and attribute in the Fig. 9 . Transformation procedure behavioral model match those in the event-gate table, the message is modified such that it contains the event id e i and gate id G j as stated in equation (2) according to the procedure in Fig. 10 . m Bk will be modif ied to (mId, e j , G i )
G. Test Case Generation from CEFSM model
Once they ICEFSM exists a number of existing test generation methods for CEFSMs can be used. One approach to testing CEFSMs is to compose them all into one machine at once, using reachability analysis to generate test cases. However, this approach is impractical due to the state explosion problem and the presence of variables and conditional statements. Some work has been done in testing the behavior of concurrent systems and network protocols that were modeled using CEFSM. Hesse et al. [14] and Bourhfir et al. [4, 5] . They use reachability analysis to generate test cases from systems modeled in CEFSMs, while Kovas et al. [18] design methods and mutation operators to enable the automation of test selection in a CEFSM model. Henniger et al. [13] generate test purpose description of the behavior of a system of asynchronously CEFSMs. [18] use mutation to enable the automation of test selection in a CEFSM model. [3] combines specification and fault coverages to generate test cases in CEFSM models. Li et al. [22] proposes a methodology to generate test cases from CEFSM-based models. FT for a fire occurrence in a Gas Burner [11] IV. APPLICATION: GAS BURNER
In this section we demonstrate our approach with a gas burner example to show the integration of a fault tree into CEFMS. We first describe the integration of one fault tree into the gas burner system. Then, we illustrate the local transitions of each gate. We adapted the gas burner model of the example from [11] to explain how the transformed model will look like in CEFSM. Fig. 11 shows the model of the gas burner system (refer to Fig. 21 for detailed transitions) and Fig. 12 shows the FT for the fire occurrence. The purpose of a gas burner is to produce heat by consuming gas. The model of the system consists of a controller component that controls the heat process and monitors a gas valve (responsible for gas supply), an air valve (responsible for air supply), an igniter (responsible for the ignition), and flame detector (monitors the state of the flame) components. The first step is the compatibility transformation. At this step we create Bclass and Fclass for the failure related entities GasValve, AirValve, and Igniter and combine the related classes according to the compatibility transformation The fault CEFSM is constructed according to a tree postorder traversal. The FT is read gate by gate starting from the root node until we reach the leftmost leaf node. The transformation starts with the leftmost leaf of the FT which is in this example "air present". The event is described in terms of class diagram as shown in Fig. 13 . Next we look for the right sibling of this gate which turns to be an AND gate between two events. The left child of this node is an event but it is not simple. It is composed of a timed event. In this case we need to use the "event timer" gate we presented in the transformation rules after configuring the value of the timer and the outgoing message number. The message id should carry the same number as the gate. In this case the gate is given number one since it is the first gate to transform. The numbering of the internal transition is not important since each gate is an independent entity and no confusion will occur. The gate is shown in Fig. 16 . The right child also is a composed event. It is an event timed for continuous time intervals, in which we use the timing continuous interval gate, give it a number (number 2 since it is the second gate transformed), and create the input and output messages. Fig. 18 . GCEFSMs for Excess Of Gas of the leaf nodes that were found so far as shown in Table  IV . Since there are no other children for this AND gate, we transform the gate itself. We use the predefined representation for AND gate from the transformation rules. Fig. 18 shows the part of the fault tree that has been transformed, the AND gate and its inputs and output. The transformed AND gate is a right child of another AND gate, that is the gate between "Air present" and "Excess of gas" events. "Air present" is a simple event from the behavioral model while the "Excess of gas" event, which is represented as "m 3 ", is the output message of this AND gate. The next step is to transform the AND gate that combines "Air present AND Excess of gas". The same transformation steps are followed and this gate is given number 4. The inputs of this gate are m B3 and m 3 messages which are equivalent to "Air present" and "Excess of gas" respectively. Fig. 19 shows the transformed gates. The next gate to be transformed is the Priority AND gate which combines the "Unsafe Environment" and "Ignition Attempted" events. For this gate the order in which these events occur is important and defined as left to right order. In this FT example, The left event, "Unsafe Environment", should occur before the event "Ignition Attempted". Therefore, this order is considered in the GCEFSM PAND gate. Fig. 20 illustrates the GCEFSM after the PAND gate is transformed. The event m B4 represents the event "Ignition Attempted" in the FT, which is a message received directly from the behavioral model by this gate indicating that the igniter is on or off. This algorithm continues until the whole FT is transformed. Fig. 21 illustrates the gas burner system transformed to an CEFSM model integrated with a transformed FT (GCEFSMs). There are two connected models, the behavioral model and the FT model. The red arrows represent the communicating messages between the CEFSMs. The transformed system shown in Fig. 21 forms a graph to which suitable coverage criteria can be applied. The FT gates that are directly connected to the behavioral model receive messages from the behavioral model and acts accordingly. The messages m 1 to m 5 represent the global transitions between the GCEFSMs for the FT part, while m I1 to m I4 represent the messages Fig. 21 by imposing the edge coverage criteria on the global transitions of the ICEFSM, we will get the test paths shown in Table V . The difference between our approach and those that use statechart such as [11, 17, 25] is that our approach is used to explicitly model systems (with communication edges) where the behavior process and the failure process intersect. Therefore, paths can be produced. These paths can be used for feasibility testing, planning for mitigation actions (ex. at the messages m 1 , m 2 in Fig. 21) , and mitigation testing. It is also possible to manipulate sensor values and create events during system testing. This model can also be used as a simulation test bed. Moreover, in our approach, different levels of details can be used for different testing purposes. For example, if we want to test the system, we can look at every GCEFSM as a whole and we do not to worry about the GCEFSMs' internal details (transitions and states) since we know how they behave. When we compared the number of states and transitions produced by our integration approach with those of [25] on this Gas burner example, we found that our ICEFSM contains 27 states and 51 transitions whereas the EFSM model of [25] will contain at least 84 states and 168 transitions. The slicing algorithm used in [25] will not be useful in partitioning the model here because the FT has two minimum cuts one of which contains all the leaf nodes except for the external event "Electrical short in cables".
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This paper proposed a testing technique that allows testing of safety-critical systems by defining a test generation framework that takes a behavioral and a fault model, transforms 
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the fault model and integrates it with the behavioral model. The integrated model can then be used with a variety of test criteria that generate tests. We provided a specific set of transformation and integration rules for a CEFSM as a behavioral model and a Fault Tree as a fault model. The key to this integration was compatibility in naming events and conditions for event occurrence. While one might be tempted to skip FTA and include the fault information "ad hoc" in the CEFSM directly, this is unsystematic and error prone. It also fails to provide a proper FTA, an important part of developing safety-critical systems. Future work will provide transformation and integration rules for other suitable behavioral and fault models. A formal analysis process that ensures compatibility of FT and BM will be investigated.
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